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Abstract 
 
Purpose - This paper focuses on analyzing the effect that public reforms have on the 
efficiency of state-owned enterprises in regulated environments.  
Design/methodology/approach - The research is focused in the postal sector where 
public and private companies must obey a legal framework related to provide a 
universal service. The analysis is carried out using a panel of 7 European postal 
operators for the period 1997-2003. The activity analyzed was the letter mail division; 
we take as key variable the unit cost of a letter and use a translog cost function where 
as independent variables we include traffic levels, labor cost per employee, quality and 
availability of the service as well as the type of ownership (public or private). 
Additionally, in a second stage the geographical differences among countries are 
considered.  
Findings - Results indicate that postal operators that experienced organizational 
changes without being privatized, such as the Spanish and Greek operators, do not 
have higher unit costs than privatized postal operators like the one of Germany and the 
Netherlands. Moreover, we find that in all cases the operator of Ireland appear to be 
the most efficient. In this case restructuring process has been carried out giving an 
important leadership role to workers. This suggests us that labor culture could be a key 
variable to study when analyzing reform processes in public enterprises.  
Originality/value - Our findings show that in a regulated environment like in the postal 
sector, public and private companies can obtain similar efficiency levels in term of unit 
costs. 
Keywords: efficiency, public enterprise reforms, postal sector. 
Category: Research paper 
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1. Introduction 
In market economies, public enterprises together with direct regulation and the concession 
system, are the main governmental mechanisms used to intervene in the economy. According 
to conventional economic theory, state-owned enterprises and direct regulation are justified in 
the presence of market imperfections, limitations or failures. However, a controversial debate 
remains about the efficiency of state-owned and privately owned firms under the same kind of 
regulation.  
Empirical literature favoring the efficiency of privately owned firms is quite extensive: (Meyer, 
1975), (Neuberg, 1977), (Borchending, Pommerhne and Schneider, 1982), (Pryke, 1982), 
(Boardman and Vining, 1989), (Megginson, Nash and Van Randenborgh, 1994). However, 
there are authors that have not found significant differences in their studies: (Caves and 
Christensen, 1980), (Millward and Parker, 1983), (Kole and Mulherin, 1997). These latter 
studies generally support the idea that under competitive conditions government and private 
firms are equally efficient (Kay and Thompson, 1986; Bishop and Kay, 1989; Hernández de 
Cos, Argimón and González–Páramo, 2004). However, studies on comparative efficiency under 
market regulation are scarce. 
It has been also argued that differences in efficiency could be better explained from the 
background of the agency theory because similar agency problems arise in public and private 
firms (Vickers and Yarrow, 1991). Thus, the efficiency would depend more on the control and 
incentive scheme the principal (owner) sets upon the agent (manager), to reward a good 
performance, than on the type of ownership itself. In fact, some authors that have studied 
privatization programs (Megginson et al, 1994; Dewinter and Malatesta, 2001) find significant 
improvements in government firms before privatization in some cases; which suggests that 
governments, at least regarding some firms, efficiently restructure the control and incentive 
scheme before selling them to private investors. Thus, if governments restructure the 
supervision on public firms and as a result improve their performance before privatization, then 
the improvement can not be attributed to the change in ownership (Dewinter and Malatesta, 
2001). There are some empirical studies that examine cases where economic reforms on public 
enterprises have been implemented instead of, or prior to, full privatization (Majumdar, 1996; 
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Martin and Parker, 1997). Regarding that issue, Megginson and Netter (2001:338), after 
analyzing the case of China, conclude: 
“The evidence from China suggests that enterprise restructuring, concentrating on 
improving the allocation of property rights and incentives, can yield large benefits even 
without privatization. Naturally, this begs the question whether economic reform coupled 
with privatization could lead to even greater performance improvements.” 
This is consistent with the findings of Brickley and Van Horn (2000) that the managers of non-
profit hospitals face similar incentives as the managers of for profit hospitals and behave in a 
similar manner. 
Nevertheless, the authors underline that more research is required about the effect that 
application of reforms, other than privatization processes, have on the efficiency of state-owned 
enterprises (Megginson and Netter, 2001:382). 
The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to assess whether organizational changes of public 
enterprises lead to equivalent improvements in efficiency as in privatized firms, when firms 
move from a monopolist to a partial-competitive condition. 
To carry out this objective we focused on the postal sector which, despite of having been 
formally re-regulated in the European Union, still operates under monopolistic conditions. In the 
European Union most of the Universal Service Providers (USPs)1 have experienced a 
continuous reform process since 1992, when the Postal Green Book of the European 
Commission was published. From then onward many USPs have had to adapt their structure to 
operate in a competitive market and at the same time to provide a universal service in a 
regulated market.  
Among the European USPs, the case of the Spanish dominant postal operator (Correos) is 
especially interesting for analyzing efficiency in the presence of organizational reforms. Firstly, 
because Spain is the country where legal changes in postal services have gone farther in the 
aim of getting a more competitive environment2 and second, it has undergone several relevant 
organizational reforms since 1992, without being privatized3. In a previous study on this case 
Morales (2005), a cross time analysis of the efficiency for the period 1987-2002 has been done. 
The author found significant improvements in financial efficiency and also increases in 
productivity as well in service quality in a minor proportion. In the present paper we extend 
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previous researches by comparing the efficiency of the Spanish operator with other European 
postal operators which have different organizational ownership status. 
To carry out this comparative analysis, a sample of seven countries for the period 1997-2003 
was chosen. Although the small number of analyzed units could appear to be an insufficient 
sample, the virtual monopoly of letter postal service4 by all of these postal operators and the 
variety in their ownership structures5, enable to draw from this panel a representative 
contribution to the issue of the efficiency levels and organizational status in a regulated 
environment like that of the postal sector.  
More specifically, the key questions considered in this paper are: 
1. What are the main factors that explain differences in unit costs of European postal 
operators? 
2. To which extent is the ownership a key variable in explaining differences among their 
unit costs? 
3. Can public enterprise reforms achieve equivalent efficiency improvements as 
privatizations? 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we summarize the main features of the 
postal market in the European Union, focusing our attention in seven countries. Methodology 
and approach are described in section 3. Then, a short description of the variables and the data 
are presented, followed by the results of the research (section 4). Finally, in section 5 we 
discuss the main conclusions of the study and their implications for future research. 
2. The postal market in the European Union (EU) 
The postal sector has undergone a significant transformation during the last decade since the 
green book came up in 1992. Many of the former traditional postal administrations have 
changed into corporations and in some cases have even been privatized or there are plans to 
do so. 
The above trend is reflected in the regulatory policy development by the European Commission 
through the Directives 97/67/EC and 2002/39/EC. Both directives aim to a gradual though 
controlled market opening of the postal sector throughout the European Union. Thus, after the 
Directive 97/67/EC was issued, all mail items weighing more than 350g were liberalized and 
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some time later the new Directive 2002/39/EC restricted the reserved area up to 100g for 2003 
and up to 50g for 2006. The objective is to get full liberalization by 2009. 
The postal directive 97/67/EC defines the minimum requirements respect to the scope of the 
universal services: access conditions for citizens, delivery requirements, and quality of service, 
as well as complaint and redress procedures. In general, the universal service obligations 
(USO) that are agreed with the national postal operator ensure that every citizen may use postal 
services on reasonable conditions and at an uniform tariff for a given postal product of a certain 
weight. 
The scope of universal services and delivery requirements do not deviate much between 
Member States legislations. In 2004 all of members in the European Union (EU) were fulfilling 
established standards and much of them were on the standard. It means that services and 
market conditions to be compared are similar.  
Take in Figure 1 
 
In general, the universal postal service includes the collection, sorting, transport and delivery of 
addressed mail up to 2 kilograms and of parcels up to 10 or 20 kilogram, as well as services to 
register or to insure an item. Express and other services are outside the universal service, which 
are offered under market conditions. Collection and delivery takes place five or six days per 
week with a few exceptions for certain rural regions.  
The segmentation of the postal market is as shown in figure 1. In this paper for homogeneity 
reason we will deal with letter post division, excluding from that newspapers and advertising 
mail. Presence of public network in the market is smaller in express and other services than in 
universal services. 
Parcel and express mail have also been excluded from the study because of differences among 
countries in USO scope, mix of products, and account information between the countries are 
significant.  
In this research seven of the fifteen countries of the EU are analyzed (Denmark, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, The Netherlands, Spain and United Kingdom). For the rest of the member 
countries it was not possible to obtain complete and reliable information, especially on the unit 
cost of letter division.  
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2.1. Market regulation: brief analysis of the sample’s countries6 
The continuous process of liberalization implemented in the postal sector of the European 
Union has forced the organizational reform of the postal administrations. In fact, all postal 
operators included in the sample have had organizational changes, some of them ending up in 
privatization. The sample includes 7 postal operators with a great variety of property forms: two 
of them with presence in the stock market, like in The Netherlands and Germany; four postal 
operators fully owned by the State, two of them with possible entry of private capital (Post 
Danmak and Royal Mail); and finally, an operator with presence of labor capital (An Post from 
Ireland).  
Companies with presence in the stock market: 
Royal PTT Post BV, the Dutch postal service, represents the more recent case of participation 
in the stock market. Royal PTT Post is a subsidiary entirely owned by the holding company TNT 
Post Group (TPG) since 1998. In 2003 the State held 34.7 % of TPG’s shares, but in 2005 this 
percentage was reduced to 17%. The remaining shares are traded on four stock exchanges. 
Postal staff have their own status as employees of PTT Post. 
The postal Law of 1 June 2000 recognized PTT Post as the Universal Service Provider in 
Netherlands giving an exclusive concession for the reserved services. The Dutch postal market 
has been relatively open to competition since 1989, when the delivery of letter mail above 500 
gram was liberalized. During the last fifteen years, the size of the reserved area was lowered in 
compliance with the postal directives 97/67/EC and 2002/39/EC and currently is around 52%. 
Furthermore, Dutch postal sector regulation has stimulated the development of competition 
because no license or registration is required to offer postal services. Actually, the competence 
have a market share of around 5% of the delivery of addressed mail, equaling a market share of 
about 10% of the liberalized part of the addressed mail market.  
The Dutch postal market is one of the most interesting in the European Union. Total mail 
volumes and per capita mail volumes are relatively high in comparison with surrounding 
countries. Moreover, the geographical circumstances in the Netherlands are almost ideal due to 
the absence of mountains and remote areas. In addition, the Netherlands has a high population 
density compared to other countries. 
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Other firm with participation in the stock market is Deutsche Post Aktiengesellschaft (AG), a 
joint-stock company managed under private law. Until 1 January 1995 this company operate as 
Deutsche Bundespost POSTDIENST when was transformed into Deutsche Post AG. Since then 
is part of Deutsche Post World Net, considered as a global integrator in mail, express and 
logistics.  In 1998 was given to Deutsche Post AG the exclusive license for the conveyance of 
the USO area valid until 2007. In addition, in November 2000 took place the IPO of Deutsche 
Post AG and the State sold 31% of shares. At present, 34% of shares are still held by the State 
and its staff consists of workers, employees and civil servants.  
Since 1998 the monopoly rights of Deutsche Post AG have been reduced significantly by the 
new postal law and licensed operators have been able to provide non-reserved letter mail 
services. Access to the market is possible after a relevant license has been granted by the 
Regulatory Authority. The number of licenses is not restricted. 
However, Deutsche Post takes around two thirds of the large market for mail, courier, express 
and parcels services. In the provision of mail, in particular the licensed sector, Deutsche Post 
has a market share of 95%, in terms of turnover (96% in volume) despite of 32% of the German 
addressed mail market is liberalized. Although the number of licensed active postal operators in 
Germany seems very high, most postal operators are just small local companies that distribute 
mail in municipalities or a cluster of municipalities. In the mail business, Deutsche Post is 
systematically leveraging the opportunities available from increasing market liberalization and 
had acquired postal operators in the USA, the UK, the Netherlands, France and Spain by 2004. 
Companies wholly public: 
On the other hand, there are companies that have always been wholly public. One of the cases 
where the State possesses a mayor control in the management is Hellenic Post (ELTA). It is the 
USP in Greece, constituted as a State enterprise under the supervision of the Ministry of 
Transport and Communications through the national regulatory authority (Hellenic 
Telecommunications & Post Commission (EETT)). The Hellenic Post staff do not have the same 
status as State employees, but ELTA is not autonomous with regard to creating and doing away 
with jobs, or recruitment. The postal sector is regulated in the Greek Postal Act, Law 3185/2003, 
amending Law 2668/1998 and the market opening follows the EU directives. Nevertheless, 
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Hellenic Post keep the 99.5% of the market share, in spite of 18% of the postal market have 
been liberalized.  
One of the most important characteristics influencing the Greek postal market is the geography 
of the country. Due to the many islands and the low degree of urbanization, the average cost of 
collection and delivery is relatively high. In addition, both the total and the per capita mail 
volumes are relatively low. The share of direct mail in the total mail volume is around 6%, a 
figure that is very far below the European average. Due to the high costs of postal delivery a 
large increase in direct mail volumes is not very likely, with the possible exception of Athens and 
some urban areas. 
In the same manner the USP in Spain (Correos y Telégrafos) is a State enterprise (limited 
company) created under law of 29 December 2000 to replace the Commercial Public Company. 
The entire share of Correos belongs to the State. According to 2003 figures, approximately two 
thirds of the Correos y Telégrafos staff are civil servants. An important element related to this is 
that since 1998 have been applied an incentive program to the delivery staff according to the 
performance. 
The Ministry of Fomento under the Subdirección General de Regulación de Servicios Postales 
is responsible for the regulation of the Spanish postal market. The current postal law (Ley 
24/1998) was modified at the end of 2002 to conform to European standards. At present, the 
reserved service refers to ordinary domestic inter-city mail, including letters and postcards within 
the weight and price limits set by Directive 2002/39/EC, as well as inward and outward cross-
border items of the same category. The intra-city postal service, the largest part of the postal 
system, has never included in the postal reservation. In fact, despite of a specific or general 
authorization is required to perform postal activities in Spain, private operators deliver a 
substantially higher percentage of letter post items (7 - 8%) than in member states which have 
repealed the reserved area entirely.  
The Spanish market is attractive for competitors because it is large and some major cities 
generate a large share of volumes. In addition, in the past few years, the volume of addressed 
mail delivered has increased. However, the low density of population and the great size of rural 
areas make difficult the competence in the inter-city letter mail. 
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In Denmark the situation has been different because the State has prepared the company to be 
privatized. Post Danmark operated as Danish Post Office till 1995 when was converted in 
independent, public company managed by a Board of Directors. Thus, Post Danmark was 
granted a concession as public postal operator until 2009. In 2002 was transformed into Limited 
Liability Company and with this change the opportunity for the Ministry of Transport to sell up to 
25% of the share capital was created. In fact, at 8 June 2005, the Danish Ministry signed a 
share purchase agreement with CVC Capital Partners (CVC) on the sale of a 25% stake in Post 
Danmark. In 2005 46% of the staff were civil servants or were employed on terms similar. 
The Danish mail market is relatively mature with mail volumes per capita ranking among the 
higher levels in Europe, but the total mail volume is low compared to other countries because of 
the reduced size of the population. Due to a high population density and a large degree of 
urbanization, the postal market can nonetheless be qualified as attractive for competitor postal 
operators, in particular in the urbanized areas. However, in Danish postal legislation, a legal 
entry barrier is in place making it more difficult for (potential) entrants to compete in the 
provision of postal services with the universal service provider. Actually, despite of having 
liberalized 40% of the postal market, the share market of the competitors just grew up to 2%.  
In the UK the Government has followed a similar strategy to Denmark even though in this case 
the company has not been privatized. In UK postal services were provided by British Post Office 
until March 2001, when it was replaced by Consignia Plc. Consignia is a public limited company 
wholly owned by the Government. The Consignia group operates under the trading names of 
Royal Mail, Parcelforce and Post Office Ltd and their staff have their own status as employees 
of the group. Royal Mail is the designed to provide postal service in the USO area. 
The postal regulator in the UK is the Postal Services Commission (Postcomm). Since the new 
postal law of June 2000, a reform program has been implemented following a major review of 
the UK postal market. Currently, in the United Kingdom, there is technically no reserved area by 
law, but there remains a small reserved area in fact. The British postal law creates a licensed 
area and instructs the regulator, Postcomm, to grant licenses to applicants based upon three 
criteria: protection of universal service, promotion of competition, and promotion of efficiency. 
Actually, since April 2001 the provision of postal services within the former reserved and 
consolidation area is partly allowed as the delivery of bulk mailings over 4,000 items is open to 
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competition which represents about 40% of the market. However, the level of competition that 
has developed in the British market to date has been less than what Postcomm anticipated. In 
2003, the market share of seven licensed private operators amounted only 0.27 percent.  
Company with labor capital: 
In our sample we have the particular case of An Post (Ireland) where the State has given capital 
participation to workers. An Post, the designated USP since 2000, is a public company which 
has a mandate to conduct its operations on a commercial basis. It was established in 1984 
under the Postal and Telecommunications Services Act, 1983. Postal staff are employees of An 
Post, but those recruited prior to 1 January 1984 have greater security of tenure. All shares of 
the company were held by the Government until 2000 when An Post established a restructuring 
on its remuneration policy. As part of that reorganization program the Government approved an 
Employee Share Ownership Plan (ESOP). Under this plan was given to workers the chance to 
hold up to 14.9% of the shares in An Post directly linked to the achievement of a specified level 
of annual cost savings. Thus, the ownership of the State was reduce to 85,10%.  
The Irish postal market is relatively small compared to other European countries and the market 
for addressed direct mail is particularly underdeveloped. On the other hand, the market for un-
addressed mail is significant, while the market for cross border mail, especially from and to the 
United Kingdom, constitutes a large part of total volume. Currently there is no real competition 
in the provision of domestic universal services. The absence of a system of postcodes and the 
hard geographical circumstances, such as for instance the lack of presence of highways and 
the low density of population, make it for this moment difficult for entrants to develop activities. 
The activities more attractive to competitor postal operators are inbound cross border mail and 
the local market of urbanized areas. 
In table 1 we summarize the main characteristics of the sample analyzed in this section. It is 
important to highlight that all postal operators included in the sample have had organizational 
changes, some of them finishing in privatization. That means, we compare reformed (without 
being privatized) versus privatized enterprises. 
Take in Table I 
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3. Specification of the cost function  
In this study we use a translog cost function in line with other empirical research in the postal 
industry7. We estimate a fixed effect model with panel data. Therefore, we assume that 
heterogeneity is captured only in the constant term μ. The β coefficients to be estimated are 
constants for the companies, assuming similar technologies. Thus, standard error component 
model assume that disturbances are homoskedastic with the same variance across time and 
individuals. The general cost function is shown as: 
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 (1) 
where the random disturbance for firm i in year t (Ui,t ) consists of a firm specific effect αi, a time 
effect λt, and a purely random term εit. In this equation λt has the same value for each company 
and varies through time. This variable includes any possible technical change across the 
analysed period and also the price effects of inputs omitted in the equation. The term αi 
represents the different intercepts and can be interpreted as fixed overhead costs. However, 
this method does not allow for considering size variables that affect companies’ costs when 
these variables show constants across time. Nevertheless, it is possible in a second stage using 
the methodology applied by (Matas and Raymond, 1998) for urban bus companies. Thus, αi can 
be corrected by the next equation: 
 0 1 ,i i iYα γ γ η= + +  (2) 
where iη is the residual and indicates the corrected fixed effects by the Y variables introduced to 
control the size differences. The estimation of the cost function with this model allows us to 
calculate two relative efficiency measures among the companies. The proposed estimation is a 
two-stage method which first estimates the standard cost function and then relates the fixed 
effects to disturbance term. In the first stage the most efficient postal operator will be the one 
with lower αi and in the second stage will be the one with the lower iη . 
Cost specifications traditionally assume operating cost as a function of output and input prices 
(labor, capital and material). However, to have a more accurate approach we consider other 
exogenous variables which can further explain cost differences among the observations. To 
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obtain a more homogeneous comparison only letter mail activity was considered, so the unit 
cost of letters (UC) is used as dependent variable. Total volume of letters (V) was employed as 
output; and costs per employee (E) as input price. Given the importance of network features to 
explain differences in mail line (letters) among countries we also consider necessary to 
introduce as explanatory variable the service quality (Q) as a measure of effectiveness of the 
postal operator (i) in a determinate time (t). As quality variable we take quality in time of delivery 
(Q) and service availability (A). In a previous analysis the grade of ruralization of the country 
appeared negatively correlated to service quality (it variable was included as geographical 
problems GP) , so we dropped this variable from the analysis. It suggests that when letters’ time 
of delivery is adapted to the density of population, the density of population appears not 
relevant. Finally, as institutional factor we take the state ownership share (S). The translog cost 
function used is specified as: 
 1 2 3 4 5ln ln ln ln ln lnit i t it it it it it itUC V E Q A Sμ α λ β β β β β ε= + + + + + + + + . (3) 
Additionally, αi was corrected by the equation [2] using as specific size effect the geographical 
variable (G). 
3.1. Specification of the variables 
The variables used for estimating the average cost function have been calculated as follows. 
Average costs (UC), came from dividing total mail costs by the respective total volume of letters 
(V). Labor unit cost (E) 8 was obtained by dividing annual labor costs by average employee in 
the year.  
Thus, following the Directive 97/67/EC, the key variable for controlling Qi,t  has been measured 
by the time of letters´ delivery and according to (Morales, 2005) it can be defined as: 
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where pD is the probability of deliver the letter in J (the day of posting) plus n days. In this work 
we only consider J+1 and J+3, when the scope of the dispatch (Z) is domestic (d) or European 
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(e), respectively. Finally, qn is the proportion of mail dispatched in Z and t0 is the year of 
reference, which in our case is 1998. 
The service availability (A) indicates facilities to use the service. We considered relevant to 
include the different access options pondered by the relative importance for each target9. So, it 
can be defined as:  
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where LB is number of letter boxes, PO number of post offices and SC number of sorting 
centers per inhabitant (Hab). S is the proportion of senders, whom can be private (P) or 
businesses (B). The term qn is the proportion of ordinary (o) or registered (r) mail dispatched in 
the year of reference t0 (1998). 
State ownership share (S) represent the percentage of capital held by the government. This 
percentage varies in three of the seven countries studies across time. 
In a second phase, to take in account size variables we estimate the equation [2]. As size 
variable we include geographical factors (G) for controlling differences between countries. It 
measures the postal operator difficulties to provide the universal service. Initially G was 
pondered by the grade of ruralization obtaining the geographical problem variable (GP), but as it 
was said it had correlations problems that can be seen in table 2. Finally, this variable was 
defined as: 
 ( )4 5 ( , ),( , )
1 1
1 ,
10i i ci j cjci cj i
G D
= = +
= ⋅∑ ∑  (6) 
where D is a measure function that computes the distance in kilometers between the five most 
populated cities of country i. Taking in account that all postal operator must obey the universal 
service, we believe it is more reliable to consider the effect of country size on unit costs thinking 
over distances among main points of traffic of letters.  
For carry out the analysis we constructed our data base collecting the necessary information 
from different sources. Financial data were mainly obtained from annual reports provided by the 
companies. In some cases key information was collected from reports prepared for the 
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European Commission. Quality information was provided by the International Post Corporation 
and statistical information was obtained from the Universal Postal Union.  
Descriptive statistics for the selected variables are show in table 2 in absolutes values. Unit cost 
of letters (UC) is expressed in euros and costs per employee (E) in thousand of euros. Volume 
(V) is expressed in number of items dispatched and quality (Q) in percentage of letters delivered 
in the fixed time. The availability (A) is measure by an index where the maximum value is 1. 
Finally, state ownership is expressed in percentage.  
Take in Table II 
4. Quantitative results 
Equation [3] was estimated using ordinary least squares with an unbalanced pool of 46 
observations. Values of unit costs and costs per employee were deflated according to the 
harmonized indices of consumer prices. Any country was selected as reference, so μ coefficient 
indicates the average interception. Additionally, according to Arellano (1987), White robust 
standard errors were computed. In table 3 we can observe results from the model 1. 
Take in Table III 
From table 3 we can observe the standard error value shows a good fit and the statistics test 
point to high confidence levels. The coefficients for fixed effect are significant in all cases. 
However, the cost function reflects a long-term constant increase which could express influence 
of omitted input prices. A possible reason could be the expenditures in automation which has 
effect in a long-term. 
4.1. Cost analysis  
The estimation results of the cost function show the expected sign for the different variables. It 
can be seen the key factor that explain the variation in unit cost is the labor prices. The 
coefficient of the cost per employee (E) variable suggest an increase of 1% in its value raise the 
unit cost around 1,24%. It confirms unit cost is very sensible to changes in the salaries.    
Another significant coefficient than explains the variation in unit cost is the volume of letters (V). 
It indicates an increase in volume of letters lead to a reduction less than proportional in unit cost 
holding other variables constant. It suggests the presence of economies of scale in the postal 
sector confirming results reported in Cohen and Chu (1997) and Cazals, Florens, Roy (2001). 
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The coefficient of the service availability (A) is positive and significant. This means an increase 
in this variable implicates an increase less than proportional in unit cost. The service quality (Q) 
also shows a positive and significant coefficient. This indicates that improvements in delivery 
time lead to higher unit costs. 
Governmental ownership (S) shows as not significant. Thus, the reduction in Government 
participation does not lead to lower unit costs.  
4.2. Efficiency analysis 
Estimation by panel data allows comparing efficiency differences between companies. 
However, in spite of controlling for the variables of the last paragraph, results from the model 1 
even show significant fixed effects in the sample. In our case companies fixed effects are also 
affected by the size of the country. Considering that local market represent an important part of 
the total volume of letters for all the operators, we take the mean of distance among 5 principal 
cities of each country as our size variable. In figure 2 can be seen a first approach. 
Take in Figure 2 
Empirical findings from equation [2] confirm that the relationship between these variables is 
positive and statistically significant. Results of ηi are presented in the “corrected fixed effect 
column” of table 4. 
-3,640036 0,653545 Lni i iGα η= + ∗ +  
                                    t-Statistic  (-2,358410)     (2,359332)  
 
R-squared:  0,526804      S.E. of regression: 0,437594 
In table 4 we show unit costs differences (in rate of differences) for each company, in respect to 
the global mean, comparing the three different measurements used to evaluate the efficiency: 
original differences calculated from the financial information; variations in unit costs after 
considering influence of variables analyzed in table 3 (model 1); results of the second model 
where the fixed effects from table 3 are corrected by geographical variable. These findings 
indicate that postal operator’s efficiency is affected by distance between principal cities.  
Take in Table IV 
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When the size effect is eliminated differences among postal operators are significantly reduced 
and efficiency improvements are showed for companies operating in larger countries. On the 
contrary, efficiency of operators from smaller countries is significantly reduced. In both cases 
the postal operator of Ireland comes out like the most efficient.  
Take in Figure 3 
For concluding the analysis it is relevant to comment that effective differences in efficiency are 
really insignificant among companies, such as can be seen in figure 3. When the companies are 
compared with Spain’s operator, after applying the second model, the mayor distance is 
showed by Ireland which has unit costs 5,97% lower than Spain. That means that differences 
are practically inexistent. 
5. Conclusions 
Results regarding cost structure show that labor cost is the main factor that explains differences 
in unit costs between countries. We also confirm the presence of economies of scale in the 
postal sector. In addition, quality and availability of the service appears significant in explaining 
differences in unit costs. We also find letters’ time of delivery varies significantly according to the 
grade of ruralization of the country. Finally, State ownership was not a key variable to explain 
different unit costs. These findings are especially important since the postal operators must 
obey a legal framework related to provide a universal service.  
So, we can conclude than in a regulated environment such as the postal sector, where in spite 
of being partially liberalized still market shortcoming and imperfections are important, public and 
private companies tend to obtain similar unit costs.  
After controlling for these variables, postal operators still show statistically significant 
differences. However, when differences in efficiency (measure as overhead unit costs) were 
adjusted according to size of the countries, there was a considerable reduction in unit cost 
differences. In both models, the postal operator of Ireland appears like the most efficient 
company, although distances respect to the others are very short. In the case of Ireland 
restructuring process has been carried out giving an important leadership role to workers. This 
suggests us labor culture could be a good variable to study when we analyze reform processes.  
Thus, according to results from table 4, postal operators which have had organizational 
changes without being privatized, such as the Spain’s and Greece’s, do not show higher unit 
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costs than privatized postal operators like Germany’s and the Netherlands’. Nevertheless, it 
could be interesting in further research to include in the sample new entrant operators from 
Easter countries to which no reform processes have been applied in order to contrast 
performances. 
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1 The Directive 97/67 of the European Commission defines the universal service provider (“USP”) as “the public or 
private entity providing a universal postal service or parts there of within a Member State, the identity of which has been 
notified to the Commission”. In each country of the European Union there is a USP and in some cases one or more 
Competitive Postal Operator (CPO). 
2 In Spain, the postal reservation has never included intra-city postal service, the largest part of a modern postal 
system. So, private operators in Spain deliver a substantially higher percentage of letter post items than in member 
states. 
3 Up to 1991 Correos was a Dirección General (Directorate General) of the following Ministries: Government, Interior 
and Transport, Tourism and Communications. From 1991 to 1998 had the title of Organismo Autónomo (Autonomous 
Entity) with commercial nature, and from April 1 1998 up to the 2001 was a Managerial Public Entity. Later, in July 3 
2001 Correos y Telégrafos became a Sociedad Anónima Estatal (Public enterprise) 
4 The Spanish postal operator is there one which has the least market share (92% in the traditional postal market). 
5 Some of the analysed operators only have State ownership, but there are also public entities with private capital, 
public with worker capital and exclusively private.  
6 The required information to elaborate this section was obtained from the annuals reports of the companies, postal 
laws, reports provide by the Universal Postal Union (2002) and by reports from the European Commission DG Internal 
Market elaborates by  ECORYS (2005), WIK Consult (2004) and Nera Economic Consulting (2004). 
7The translog cost function is used by Mizutani y Uranishi (2003) and Nera (2004) to analyse efficiency in postal sector. 
8 Staff costs represent around 75% of total in postal sector apart from differences staff prices between the countries. 
9 Business customers send in average 85% of the total volume of letters in the analyzed countries. 
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Figure 1: Structure of the postal market 
 
Source: Wik-Consult (2004:22) 
 
Figure 2: Relation unit cost vs distance in the postal sector 
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Figure 3: Relative differences in efficiency respect to Spain. 
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Table 1: Analysis of the sample 
Postal 
Operator 
Country Property rights Stock Market Market  Share  
 (2003) 
Relevant 
Organizational 
Changes 
Deutsche Post Germany Majority public Yes  (Nov.-2000) 96% 1998; 2000 
Correos Spain Wholly Public No 92,9% 1998; 2001 
An Post Ireland Majority public No 100% 2000 
Post Danmark Denmark Wholly public (SO) No 98% 1999; 2002 
Hellenic post Greece Wholly public No 99,5% 1998 
TPG Post The Netherlands Majority Private Yes (1997) 95% 1998; 2000 
Royal Mail United Kingdom Wholly public (SO) No 99,7% 2000 
 SO= selling option 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics and correlations 
 UC E V Q A S GP G 
UC 1.000000 * 0.504548 -0.046273  *0.649792  0.291621  0.006670 *-0.501426 -0.478547
E * 0.504548 1.000000  0.100781 * 0.746727  0.029080 *-0.737955 *-0.835258 *-0.780317
V -0.046273  0.100781 1.000000  0.427019 -0.075685 -0.012390 -0.332408  0.371284
Q * 0.649792  0.746727  0.427019 1.000000  0.219659 -0.351050 *-0.854690 -0.447078
A  0.291621  0.029080 -0.075685  0.219659 1,000000  0.459837 -0.022028 -0.258675
S  0.006670 *-0.737955 -0.012390 -0.351050  0.459837 1.000000  *0.550452 * 0.523026
GP *-0.501426 *-0.835258 -0.332408 *-0.854690 -0.022028 * 0.550452 1.000000 * 0.657462
G -0.478547 *-0.780317  0.371284 -0.447078 -0.258675  0.523026 * 0.657462 1.000000
Mean 0.448786 35912.29 8314.74 82.22248 0.430062 87.50 59.05464 2.993609
Median 0.467492 35476.09 3936.95 91.40804 0.394299 100.00 59.26052 2.713000
Maximum 0.663018 60882.05 21760.00 95.96443 0.686136 100.00 123.8027 5.369000
Minimum 0.211287 14138.69 543.00 40.21850 0.285365 34.80 8.223296 8.060000
Std. Dev. 0.119892 12243.67 8186.32 18.33782 0.118325 22.21 37.70431 1.579816
*Denotes significance at the 1% level. 
Table 3: Estimation results of the translog cost function 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic P-value 1- confidence levels 
μ -9.780811 -8.285511 0.0000 * 
Ln(V) -0.379178 -2.825805 0.0086 * 
Ln(E) 1.170641 7.526268 0.0000 * 
Ln(Q) 0.115802 3.975084 0.0004 * 
Ln(A) 0.372973 2.730261 0.0108 * 
Ln(S) -0.059096 -1.116004 0.2739 
Fixed Effects (Cross) αi Fixed Effects (Period) λt 
 Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.  Coefficient t-Statistic Prob. 
Germany 0.664880 -7.629644 0.0000* 1997--C -0.036539 -8.364421 0.0000* 
Spain 0.343259 -8.481388 0.0000* 1998--C -0.026005 -8.329885 0.0000* 
Ireland -0.926123 -8.645472 0.0000* 1999--C -0.014414 -8.308105 0.0000* 
Denmark 0.079736 -8.205127 0.0000* 2000--C -0.006458 -8.296159 0.0000* 
Greece -0.302880 -8.390707 0.0000* 2001--C -0.010447 -8.265041 0.0000* 
Netherlands -0.355430 -7.925874 0.0000* 2002--C 0.031353 -8.224148 0.0000* 
United 
Kingdom 0.366750 -8.183538 0.0000* 2003--C 0.062511 -8.218300 0.0000* 
R-squared 0.980264 S.E. of regression 0.052873 F-statistic 81.80760 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.968281 Durbin-Watson 1.413021
P-value 
 (F-statistic) 0.000000 
*Denotes significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 4: Ranking of companies’ efficiency (overhead unit costs respect to mean) 
Postal 
operator Country 
Differences 
in Ln(UC) 
Ranking Fixed effect Ranking Corrected 
Fixed effect 
Ranking
Deutsche Post Germany 0,117393 5  0,66488 7 0,29588 6 
Correos Spain -0,589228 1 0,34326 5 -0,08503 3 
An Post Ireland 0,183704 6 -0,92612 1 -0,67437 1 
Post Danmark Denmark 0,350845 7 0,07974 4  0,15607 4 
Hellenic post Greece 0,041544 4 -0,30288 3 -0,32234 2 
TPG Post Netherlands 0,015449 3 -0,35543 2  0,35205 7 
Royal Mail United Kingdom -0,107836 2 0,36675 6 0,27775 5 
Standard deviation 0,300728  0,543771  0,382731  
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